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Case No. 8073

IN THE SUPREME COURT
of the

STATE OF UTAH
GEORGE S. RIN·GWOOD, HAROLD
T. RINGWOOD, LUELLA DUNCAN
and ESTHER JANE OS·WALD,

R E S,l)t;l/ DEN r..s -r

Plaintiffs,

vs.
LOTTIE S·. BRADF:ORD·, also known
as Lottie Bradford White,
A/)PIE" t,.t. A-1'1 r-1

Defendant.

BRIEF OF PLAINTIF'FS AND RESPONDENTS,

___, .......

---ci~~~:s._;;~~~;;;-c:;

LAWRENCE L. SUMMERHAYS,
Attorney for Respondents.

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

INDEX
Page
STATEMENT OF FACT'S ........................................................................

1

STATE:MENT' OF POINT'S ....................................................................

5

ARGUME'N·T ................................................................................................

6

POINT NO. 1.-The trial court properly found that the fence was
not used or intended as a boundary fence by respondents, and
properly found that the doctrine of boundary by acquiescence
was inapplicable under the facts of the case. --------------------------------

6

CON·CLUSION --------------------------·-·--------------------------····-··-······--·-----------···-······-· 14

CASES CITED
Tripp v. Bagley, 74 U. 57, 276 P. 9'12

---------------------------·······----··············6,

11

Holmes v. Judge, 31 U. 269, 87 P. 1009 ....................................................

6

Moyer v. Langton, 37 U. 9, 106 P. 509 ··························-·················--------

6

Rydalch v. Anderson, 37 U. 99, 107 P. 2!5 ................................................

6

Young v. Hyland, 37 U. 229, 108 P. 1124 ····················--···········-----·-········

6

Farr v. Thom·as, 41 U. 1, 122 P. 906 ··················-···-···--·-·················-········

6

Binford v. Eccles, 41 U. 457, 126 P. 333 ····-········---····-·····-············-········

6

Christensen v. Beutler, 42 U. 392, 131 P. 6'66 ·····-··-·······--····-··············-··

6

Tanner v. Stratton, 44 U. 253, 139 P. 940 ·-······--------··-·-························-··

6

Warren v. Mazzuchi, 45 U. 612, 148 P. 360 ............................................

6

Van Cott v. Casper, 53 U. 161, 176 P. 849 ............................................

6

Brown v. Milliner, Utah 1951, 232 P. 2 202 ........................................ 7, 12
Glenn v. Whitney, Utah 1949, 209 Pac. '(2) 257 ........................8, 9, 10, 11
Home Owners' Loan Gorp. v. Dudley, 105 U. 208, 141 P. 2d 160........

9

Smith v. Nelson, U. 197 P. 2d 132 ............................................................

9

Thompson on Real Property, Section 3309 .......................................... 9, 10
Peterson v. Johnson, 84 U. 89, 34 P. 2d 697 ········-····-------------------------·-···· 11

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

IN THE SUPREME COURT
of the

STATE OF UTAH
GEORGE S. RINGWOOD, HAROLD
T. RINGWOOD·, LUELLA DUNCAN
and ESTHER JANE OS·WALD,
Plaintiffs,

Case No.
8073

vs.
LOTTIE S. BRADF·ORD, also known
as Lottie Bradford White,
Defendant.

BRIEF OF' PLAINTIF'FS AND RESPONDENTS

STATEMENT OF F'ACTS
For the most part the facts set forth by the appellant
in his brief are correct but do not present the situation
in full from the respondents standpoint. We will therefore make our own statement of the facts as we deem
them material to our presentation of the case.
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Plaintiffs brought an action of ejectment in the District Court of Salt Lake County to require defendant to
remove her cabin from the property of the plaintiffs.
Judgment was granted in favor of the plaintiffs and
defendant has filed this appeal clai1ning title to the
property on which the cabin was located by virtue of the
doctrine of establishing a boundary by acquiescence.
The only question presented by this appeal 1s
whether or not under the facts presented the trial courts
finding that the doctrine of the e·stablishment of a
boundary by acquiescence was inapplicable, was proper.
The plaintiffs and the defendant are adjoining property owners of real property located in Emigration Canyon in Salt Lake County, State of Utah. Plaintiffs' East
boundary and defendant's West boundary are common
to both pieces of property (P ex. 1, R. 21). The plaintiffs'
predecessors in title were their parents, William H. Ringwood and Julia E. Ringwood (R. 26, P ex. 1). William H.
Ringwood purchased part of the property in about 1921
(P ex. 2), and one .lot at a later date (R. 66, 72), and conveyed all the property to Julia E. Ringwood, his wife, on
January 3, 1935, a few days before his death (P ex.l).
Julia E. Ringwood conveyed the property to Ethel J. Oswald, one of the plaintiffs herein in 1940, who in turn
conveyed an undivided 14 interest to each of the other
plaintiffs in February of 1949 (P ex. 1).
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rrhe predecessor in title of the defendant was her
daughter \vho acquired title in about 1935 (R. 44).
Defendant's daughter received the property as a gift
fro1n her father, Lionel Bradford, an attorney, who
acquired the property for work he had done (R. 47, 48).
His na1ne, however, does not appear in the chain of title.
Defendant acquired the property in 1948 from her
daughter (R. 56).
In 1923 William H. Ringwood, with the assistance of

J. T. Oswald, one of the witnesses for plaintiffs, was
building a cabin on his property and had also just planted
some young Boxelder trees. In order to keep the sheep
then grazing in Emigration Canyon from destroying the
Boxelder trees, Mr. Oswald, in that year, at William H.
Ringwood's direction, built a barbed wire fence, (R. 61)
without any attempt whatever to put the fence on a
boundary line. The fence was erected from a point on a
steep bank of Emigration Canyon stream in a general
Northerly direction (R. 62, Def. ex. 10). It did not reach
to the South property line, being about 80 feet north of
it (R . .J-1) nor did it reach to the North property line of
Ringwoods property (R. 72- 73).
At the time of the construction of the fence, Mr.
Ringwood was buying three lots. Sometime after the
fence was constructed, additional property East of the
three lots was purchased (R·. 66, 72), but the fence was
never changed from its original position (R. 15, 66, 72).
William H. Ringwood knew that the fence was not on the
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property line (R. 67) and he told his son-in-law, Dr.
Halgren, that the fence ran North and South, while the
line was on an angle.
In the late summer of 1933, Mr. Ringwood suffered
a heart attack and 1noved into Salt Lake City and never
went to the property again (R. 67, 30).
In 1934 during 1fr. Ringwood's absence, Mr. Bradford built a cabin on part of the property presently in
dispute, all of which cabin except for possibly a corner
of the porch on the Northeast corner, rests entirely on
property deeded to plaintiffs ( R. 21, D &.x. 10). Defendant's cabin remained in its original location without
objection upon the part of the plaintiffs until a survey
was made for the plaintiffs about two years before trial
when they were trying to sell their property and when
it was first discovered by plaintiffs that defendant's
cabin occupied the plaintiffs' property (R.. 27, 28).
Margaret Bradford Pitts was the owner of the property at the time the cabin was built and until about 1948
(R. 56). She testified that she did not go up to the cabin
more than once or twice each summer, that her father
selected the site of the cabin and that 8he did not know
whether the site was selected because it was a nice flat
area or because it was on her property (R. 48, 49). She
further testified that she had never had a conversation
with any member of the Ringwood family relative to the
fence line (R. 46) and that the Ringwoods did not occupy
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their property up to the fence line (R. 46). Witnesses
for the plaintiffs also testified that the property was
never occupied by plaintiffs or their predecessors up to
or even near the fence line (R. 31, 70) and that they did
not know what the defendant clairned or what they were
doing with respect to the property East of the fence
line (R·. 75, 76, 28).
The Eastern part of the plaintiffs' property is covered with ·brush and trees and the stakes put in on the
original survey were not visible without going to the
immediate point of the stake (R. 75). In fact, the East
half of the Ringwood property was r-'-ot used, for any
purpose (R. 70).
There is no evidence in the record of any conversation or dispute between the respective property owners
or of any dispute or conversation concerning the boundary until after the survey made at the· request of the
plaintiffs approximately two years prior to the filing
of this action.
From a decree in the trial court ordering the defendant to remove her cabin within 30 days, the defendant
has filed this appeal.

STATEMENT OF POINTS
POINT I.
THE TRIAL COURT PROPERLY FOUND THAT THE
FENCE WAS NOT USED OR INTENDED AS A BOUNDARY
FENCE BY RESPONDENTS, AND PROPER_LY FOUND
THAT THE DOCTRINE OF BOUNDARY BY ACQUIESCENCE
WAS INAPPLICABLE UNDER THE FACTS OF THE CASE.
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ARGUMENT
POINT I.
THE TRIAL COURT PROPERLY FOUND THAT THE
FENCE WAS NOT USED OR INTENDED AS A BOUNDARY
FENCE BY RESPONDENTS, AND PROPERLY FOUND
THAT THE DOCTRINE OF BOUNDARY BY ACQUIESCENCE
WAS INAPPLICABLE UNDER THE FACTS OF THE CASE.

Counsel for defendant contends that the fence constructed on the Ringwood property in 1923 to keep the
sheep out of the trees and shrubbery planted there was
acquiesced in and adopted as a boundary line between
the plaintiffs' and defendant's property.
In the case of Tripp vs. Bagley, 74 U. 57, 276 P. 912,
the Court, on page 916 citing the following cases: Holmes
v. Judge, 31 Utah 269,87 P. 1009; Moyer v. Langton, 37
Utah 9, 106 P. 509; Rydalch v. Anderson, 37 Utah 99, 107
P. 25; Young v. Hyland, 37 Utah 229, lOS P. 1124; Fa:rr
v. Thomas, 41 Utah 1, 122 P. 906; Binford v. Eccles,
41 Utah 457, 126· P. 333; Christensen v. Beutler, 42 Utah
392, 131 P. 666; Tanner v. Stratton, 44 Utah 253, 139 P.
940; Warren v. M azzuchi, 45 Utah 612, 148 P. 360 ; Van
Cott v. C.asper, 53 Utah 161, 176 P. 849, stated:
"In these cases the rule is announced and
reiterated that, where the owners of adjoining
lands occupy their respective premises up to a
certain line which they mutually recognize as the
boundary line for a long period of time, they and
their grantees may not deny that the boundary
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line thus recognized is the true one. The general
rule thus repeatedly enunciated has become the
settled law in this jurisdiction."
Again in the case of Brown v. Milliner, Utah 1951,
232 P. 2, 202 at Page 207, our Court says:
~'we

have further held in this state that in the
absence of evidence that the owners of adjoining
property or their predecessors in interest ever
expressly agreed as to the location of the boundary between then1, if they have occupied their
respective premises up to an open boundary line
visibly marked by monuments, fences, or buildings, for a long period of time and mutually
recognized it as the dividing line between them,
the law will imply an agreement fixing the boundary. as located if it can do so consistently with the
facts appearing, and will not permit the parties
nor their grantees to depart from said line."
In the instant case there is not mutual recognition
of the fence line as the boundary line nor did the plaintiffs and their predecessors occupy their premises up to
the fence line at all, which fact was testified to by witnesses for both plaintiffs and defendant. Defendant's
daughter, who owned the cabin and land adjacent to the
plaintiffs' land at the time the cabin was built and up
until 1948, when she conveyed it to the defendant, testified that the plaintiffs did not occupy their property to
the fence line and that she had never had a conversation
with anyone of the Ringwood family relative to the fence
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line. She testified that she didn't know very Inuch about
them and only went to the cabin once or twice in the
summer months.
Dr. Halgren, a witness for the plaintiffs and the
husband of a deceased daughter of William H. Ringwood,
testified that he had a cabin on the Ringwood property
and lived in the same for several years prior to 1934, and
visited it on occasion after William Ringwood's death
and that the East half of the Ringwood property was
never used for any purpose. Harold Ringwood, who lived
in the Ringwood cabin during the years 1940 to about
1946, testified that he did not occupy the Ringwood property even close to the fence line. George Ringwood, one
of the plaintiffs, also· testified that they did not go near
the Bradford property.
The case of Glenrn v. Whitney, Utah 1949, 209, Pac. (2),
257 is in many respects in point in this case. In that
case a third party, a predecessor in interest to plaintiff,
built a fence between the pToperty, subsequently acquired
by plaintiff and defendant, but actually lying upon the
plaintiff's property, to prevent the escape of the third
party's livestock from the third party's property; subsequently, the defendants and their predecessors cultivated the property up to the fence, always assuming that
they owned to the fence line. The plaintiff apparently
did nothing about the fence line or use the land up to the
fence line. In the trial court, the parties were held to
have acquiesced in the fence as a boundary and the

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

9
defendant \Yas given judgment. In reversing the judgment on appeal our court stated, comrnencing on Page

260:
"The cases and text writers in stating the
general rule announce the principle that the question as to whether an established fence line has
becorne the true boundary line separating two
adjoining tracts of land is one of fact and the
court must evaluate the facts in each case. Before
doing so, we find it necessary to define the meaning of certain terms in view of the fact that there
seems to be some confusion in the minds of the
litigants as to what elements are necessary to
establish a boundary line in a suit of this character. If it was not clear before the case of Tripp v.
Bagley, 7-! Utah 57, 276 P. 912, 69 A.L.R. 1417, it
was expressly recognized there and in all Utah
cases in point handed down subsequent to it, see
Home Owners' Loan Corp. v. Dudley, 105 Utah
208, 141 P. 2d 160; and Smith v. Nelson, Utah,
197 P.2d 132, that there must be some uncertainty
or a dispute between adjoining owners as to the
location of the true boundary line before a fence
which they subsequently erect to resolve their
differences and in which they acquiesce for a long
period of time, may be taken as the agreed
boundary line. Using the terms "uncertainty" and
"dispute" loosely, we might say that the parties
here were uncertain as to the location of the
boundary line inasmuch as neither of them had
attempted to locate it prior to the survey made
by plaintiff. This, however, is not "uncertainty"
as this term wa.s meant to be used in this connection for as is said in Thompson on Real Property,
section 3309 :
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"'If an owner ignorant of his true boundaries
by n1istake acquiesces in a line as a boundary, he
and his grantees are not thereby precluded fro1n
afterwards claiming to the true line, and it has
been held that one who has no knowledge that the
adjoining owner has encroached upon his land
cannot be held to have lost his rights by acquiescence in sueh occupancy no matter how long continued, for one cannot waive or acquiesce in a
wrong while ignorant that it has been committed,
especially where each party has equal means of
ascertaining the correct line.'
"Thus, lack of knowledge as to the location
of the true boundary is not synonymous with
uncertainty. This being true, it cannot be said
that the parties here were uncertain as to the
location of the true boundary line, for there is
nothing in the record before us to indicate that
either of them had any idea as to the true location
of the boundary line apart from an assumption
that some existing fences separating the lands
of other owners in the area might make the section
lines.
"Furthermore, the fence was not erected to
settle any uncertainty or dispute between the litigants or their predecessors in interest for according to the undisputed testimony of Mr. Bishop,
he erected the fence merely to prevent the escape
of his livestock to the east, and he did not attempt
to erect a boundary line between the properties
now involved or to settle any doubt or uncertainty
as to the location of the true boundary line.
According to defendant and his father, from whom
defendant deraigns his title, they had merely
assumed that the fence that had &.xisted at the
time defendant's father purchased the property,
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was on the boundary line. The theory under which
a boundary line is established by long acquiescence along an existing fence line is founded on
the doctrine that the parties erect the fence to
settle some doubt or uncertainty which they n1ay
have as to 'the location of the true boundary, and
they compromise their differences by agreeing to
accept the fence line as the limiting line of their
respective lands. The mere fact that a fence happens to be put up and neither party does anything
about it for a long period of time will not ,establish
it as the true boundary. Peterson v. Johnson, 84
Utah 89, 34 P.2d 679; Tripp v. Bagley, Supra."
In the instant case, there is evidence that William S.
Ringwood had his property surveyed a short time before
his death and that some of the survey stakes were still
in place when the subsequent survey was made by the
plaintiffs. However, for several months before and at
the time the cabin was constructed upon the Ringwood
property, and for a. few months thereafter, Mr. Ringwood
was confined to his home in Salt Lake City with a heart
condition and apparently knew nothing about the construction of the cabin. From all the evidence in the case,
none of the plaintiffs knew that the cabin had been built
upon their property until the survey was made approximately two years before the time of the trial. Imn1ediately upon discovery of that fact, they contacted the
defendant and requested that the cabin be re1noved.
There had never been any dispute about the boundary
line although defendant tried to establish some conversation between Mr. Bradford, who never appeared as
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the record owner of the property, and Harold Ringwood,
'vho at the ti1ne of the alleged conversation, was not the
owner of the Ringwood property, with respect to the
boundary line. Harold Ringwood denies that he had
ever had such a conversation but did state that he had
talked to the defendant about the cabin after the last
survey had been made. The defendant on cross-examination when asked if she had heard any conversation with
respect to the boundary could not state that she had.
As in the Glen v. Whitney case, supra, the fence on
the Ringwood property was put up purely for keeping
sheep from traversing on the Ringwood property. F'or a
few years prior to the construction of the cabin and for
the period subsequent to that time, apparently no work
was done on the fence to keep it in condition by either of
the adjoining land owners. The defendant i~ her brief,
page 13, indicates the activity of the plaintiffs with
respect to the boundary line when he says that nothing
but silence has been heard from the respondents and
their predecessors for a period of 18 years since the
cabin was constructed near the fence line. This was true
for about 16 years but after the survey, the plaintiffs
definitely requested the defendant to remove her cabin.
The two properties are located as testified to, in a woody
area in Emigration Canyon. The plaintiffs' testimony
indicates that there is a considerable amount of brush
and trees between the cabins which were on the Ringwood
property and the cabin constructed by the defendant's
predecessor. The pictures of the defendant's cabin
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ad1ni tted in to evidence, though taken in the winter time,
indicate the nature of the brush. At the time the defendant's cabin was constructed on the property, a survey
had been 1nade of the plaintiffs' property and Mr. Bradford, who was constructing the cabin, could have readily
determined the boundary line if he had exerted a little
effort to do so. ~Ir. Ringwood undoubtedly knew the
location of the boundary line and would have, no doubt,
objected to the construction of the cabin on this location
had he been on the premises at any time when the same
\vas being constructed, but as previously indica ted, he
did not return to the Canyon property at all after his
heart attack in the late summer of 1933, and knew nothing
about the cabin or its location.
There isn't any evidence that there was ever any
dispute between the parties with respect to the boundary
line or any actual discussion of it until after the survey
\Vas made approximately two years prior to the filing of
the lawsuit. There is no evidence whatever that there
was any discussion between Mr. and Mrs. Willian H.
Ringwood and the defendant and her predecessors in title
at all. It is undisputed that the fence was old and broken
down and covered only a portion of the distance between
plaintiffs' South boundary line and plaintiffs' North
boundary line when defendant's cabin was built and when
defendant secured her property and that it did not reach
to either boundary line. However, defendant seeks to
have the Court estabiish a boundary line by acquiescence
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for a substantial portion of the line claimed where there
has never been any fence line and no use shown of the
property.
The fence line as it existed was neither parallel to
the actual line nor was it even close to it. Mr. Bradford
who bu~lt the cabin apparently picked out the only flat
place where a cabin could be constructed and built it without respect to boundary locations.
The fence was not, subsequent to any dispute between
adjoining landowners, nor at any time, erected to resolve
any dispute or difference between the adjoining landowners with respect to their boundary, and defendant
has failed entirely to prove the necessary facts to establish her title to the property on which the cabin is located
under the doctrine of establishment of a boundary line
by acquiescence.

CONCLUSION
In conclusion the respondents respectfully submit
that this court should enter its order confirming the
findings, conclusions and decree of the District Court,
requiring the defendant appellant to remove her cabin
from the property of the piaintiffs.
Respectfully submitted,

LAWRENCE L. SUMMERHAYS,
Attorney for Respondents.

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

